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ABSTRACT
This study examines the constitution of religiously tolerant subjectivity
among Indonesian Muslim pre-service teachers. Complementing existing
studies in religious tolerance education which were mainly survey-based
and experimental, this qualitative research employed a discourse analysis
methodology which connects individual-level analysis with the larger
socio-religio-political situations in contemporary Indonesia. Specifically,
this study aims to explore discourses drawn upon by young Muslim pre-
service teachers to understand religious tolerance in the context of con-
temporary Indonesia, a Muslim-majority Southeast Asian country strug-
gling to navigate its history of moderate Islam and a recent surge of
conservatism. The findings exhibited three key discourses through
which participants’ religiously tolerant subjectivity was constituted,
namely, a discourse of spiritual Islam, a discourse of postmodern sensi-
bilities, and a discourse of concern over the growing conservative,
Islamist, and radical groups. The implications were discussed in relation







The current study seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge on religious tolerance
education in at least two ways. Firstly, the study adds to the growing epistemological and
methodological diversity within the field by employing a discourse analysis methodology. The
majority of studies in this field has drawn upon a realist paradigm (Willig 2013) which mainly
took the form of quantitative surveys aiming to identify psycho-social mechanisms underlying
tolerant attitudes (e.g. Bertram-Troost and Miedema 2017; Sumaktoyo 2018), and experiments
which evaluate the impact of tolerance education programmes (e.g. Al Sadi and Basit 2012�;
Berger et al. 2016). In recent years, a growing number of studies have also employed qualita-
tive methodologies, including mixed methods, to investigate religious tolerance education (e.g.
Bertram-Troost, Schihalejev, and Neill 2014). Underpinned by constructivist epistemologies like
Jackson’s (2011) interpretive approach, these qualitative researchers sought to explore a more
complex, in-depth dynamic of religious tolerance education. More recently, there have been
calls to further diversify the epistemological and methodological approaches in this field, such
as Wijaya Mulya and Aditomo’s (2019) call for more contextual, critical, and discursive forms of
analysis on religious tolerance education – which the current study is responding to by
employing a discourse analysis methodology.
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Secondly, the current research complements existing studies on religious tolerance education at
the macro (e.g. national policies and curricula) and meso levels (e.g. school policy, classroom
strategy) with a micro, individual-level (e.g. student, teacher) analysis, but without disconnecting it
from the larger operations of power in a given society. At the macro level, scholars have argued for
educational policies and institutional strategies which are supportive of religious tolerance, such as
non-confessional, non-theological religious education (RE) (Parker 2014), confessional but pluralism-
oriented RE (Van Der Walt, Potgieter, and Wolhuter 2010), and a whole-school approach to religious
tolerance (Raihani 2011). At the meso level, curriculum contents and delivery methods effective for
fostering religious tolerance have also been examined, including using resources for tolerance from
one’s own religion (Al Sadi and Basit 2012; Baidhawy 2007; Schweitzer 2007), facilitating positive
interfaith interactions (Bertram-Troost, Schihalejev, and Neill 2014; Sumaktoyo 2018), and providing
information about the religious Other (Windle 2011). At individual level, skills and competencies
necessary for religious tolerance have been investigated, among others, epistemic cognition
(Aditomo 2019), empathy (De Silva 2011), perspective taking (Berger et al. 2016), intellectual humility
(Kraft and Basinger 2016), and dialogue competencies (Morris 2011). In these studies, the contact
hypothesis – a now-classic term coined by the social psychologist Allport (1954, 281) – has repeat-
edly proved itself accurate, in which ‘equal status contact between majority and minority groups in
the pursuit of common goals . . . and common humanity’ significantly reduces prejudice and fosters
tolerance. Seeking to (re)connect these ostensibly universal educational-psychological mechanisms
with religio-political-ideological contestations in a specific context, the current study draws upon the
notion of discourse to demonstrate the inextricable relationship between power, knowledge, and
subjectivity (Foucault 1982) in the constitution of religiously tolerant subjects.
Specifically, this study aims to explore discourses drawn upon by young Muslim pre-service
teachers to understand RE and religious tolerance in the context of contemporary Indonesia,
a Muslim-majority Southeast Asian country struggling to navigate its history of moderate Islam
and a recent surge of conservatism. Occupying a position between a student and a teacher,
participants’ subjectivity as both an Indonesian youth, a religious person, and a future teacher
provided a unique window into the exploration of contextual, relevant, and effective ways of
teaching religious tolerance. A focus on future teachers is crucial in this regard, because changes
in educational policy must necessarily be translated into classroom practices by teachers, whose (un)
willingness, (in)abilities, and (mis)interpretations will influence the impact of those policies.
Therefore, by identifying these Muslim pre-service teachers’ ways of being tolerant, we seek to
offer insights for advancing religious tolerance education through a better understanding of the
discursive ‘logics’ which are intelligible for these future teachers.
Theoretically, the current research is informed by discourse theories, particularly feminist readings
of Foucauldian poststructuralism (Davies 1991; Weedon 1987). Discourse is a set of interconnected
ideas through which an individual gives meaning to their social worlds and guides their actions.
Since there are multiple and shifting discourses in any field of knowledge, there is always a range of
possibilities to think, talk, and act differently about/on a specific phenomenon (Willig 2013).
Depending on the availability of discourses in one’s situation, an individual may exercise agency in
drawing upon certain discourses and not others (Davies 1991); these discourses then enable
different forms of subjectivity and action. Here, subjectivity refers to one’s sense of self which is
always-already discursively constituted (Weedon 1987). For instance, understanding religious mino-
rities like Ahmadiyya groups through a discourse of heresy – as campaigned by some Indonesian
Islamic hard-line groups – has resulted in incidents of persecution (Irawan 2017). There are other
discourses to be drawn upon which may result in more tolerant attitudes and behaviours, such as
a discourse of rights or citizenship. The circulation of these competing discourses in a society is not
a ‘neutral’ process, but always-already political as it is a part of the operation of modern power in
governing the society. Here, politics is about discursive contestation, a competition to ‘fix’ meanings
into individual’s subjectivity (Weedon 1987). Identifying and circulating alternative discourses and
subjectivities are, therefore, acts of political resistance. This is precisely our agenda in the current
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research, namely, to identify and circulate discourses that may enable religious tolerance among
contemporary Indonesian youth against the backdrop of growing conservatism. Since discursive
constellations in a society are always shifting, contextual, and continuously contested, the next
section briefly introduces contemporary Indonesian contexts vis-à-vis religious relations and toler-
ance education.
Post-authoritarian Indonesia: public religiosity, pancasila citizenship, and tolerance
education
As the world’s fourth most populous country and home of the largest Muslim population, Indonesia
has demonstrated both promising and disheartening moments in terms of religious tolerance
throughout its 75 years of independence. In 1945, Indonesia’s founding fathers and mothers
expressed a commitment for religious tolerance in the formulation of the state ideology, Pancasila.
Literally translated as five principles, Pancasila includes (1) a belief in one supreme God, (2) humanity,
(3) national unity, (4) democracy, and (5) social justice. The first principle initially included the clause
‘with the obligation for Muslims to carry out the Islamic law.’ However, after considering religious
diversity in Indonesia, particularly non-Muslim-majority regions, the leaders of two largest Islamic
civil organisations (i.e. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, more below) agreed to erase the
clause, preferring a more religiously inclusive wording (Intan 2006). With the phrase ‘unity in
diversity’ inscribed on the country’s symbol of the Garuda bird, this promising beginning gave rise
to Indonesia’s frequently mentioned self-identification as ‘not secular nor Islamic, but a religious,
Pancasila country’. Although atheists, agnostics, and indigenous religions were largely silenced,
Pancasila at least provided an official-ideological foundation for the possibility of a multicultural,
tolerant, religious citizenship (Fearnley-Sanders and Yulaelawati 2008; Hoon 2017).
During Suharto’s authoritarian regime (1966–1998), Islamists suffered repression as Suharto was
quick to eliminate any threat to his ruling, including from political Islam. As result, moderate Muslim
organisations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah flourished. State-funded Islamic
Institutes (IAIN) were established across Indonesia, where progressive Muslim thinkers such as
Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid became influential and had significant impacts on
Indonesia’s civil Islam (Hefner 2019). The ‘fragile but functioning balance’ between NU and
Muhammadiyah (Schäfer 2019, 238) also successfully prevented a single version of Islam from
being adopted or endorsed by the state. Nevertheless, the fall of Suharto in 1998 marked the
beginning of Indonesia’s democratic era which eased both militaristic and social repression on
political and conservative Islamic groups (Fealy 2019). These groups have grown exponentially
ever since, and influenced various fields from politics (e.g. Islamist-leaning parties), the economy
(e.g. sharia banking, halal certification), entertainment (e.g. hijra/born-again celebrities), to urban
spatial development (e.g. sharia residential complexes, Islamic-branded consumption spaces). Public
expressions of religiosity, most noticeably women’s veil, have become increasingly fashionable. After
the 1998 democratic reformation, the number of terrorist bombings (e.g. in Bali, Jakarta, and
Surabaya), large-scale religious conflicts (e.g. in Ambon and Poso), and persecution of religious
minorities (e.g. against the Ahmadis, Shi’ites, and Christians) have also increased. One of the high-
profile cases led to the imprisonment of Jakarta’s Christian ex-governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama over
a blasphemy criminal charge in 2017, where conservative and Islamist groups successfully demon-
strated their mobilisational power in massive rallies against the ex-governor.
Scholars have examined these worrying transformations of Indonesia’s religious landscape and
offered at least two main suggestions: reviving Pancasila citizenship as the framework for Indonesia’s
democracy (Hefner 2019; Hoon 2017), and reinvigorating the moderate Islamic groups (Afrianty
2012; Fealy 2019). Each of these approaches has its own challenges. As the official ideology unifying
Indonesia from the outset, Pancasila has enjoyed a wide socio-political acceptance across commu-
nities (Intan 2006). While it was re-appropriated by Suharto into an apparatus of oppression against
his enemies and formally imposed on young generations in a top-down manner, there have been
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recent efforts during the Jokowi presidency to revive Pancasila as fashionable for the millennials,
particularly in responding to Islamist anti-democracy movements (Kuwado 2017). However, shifting
its long history of tokenistic taking up by the young generation into a living, tolerant everyday
philosophy might not happen overnight.
Similarly, the second suggestion – reinvigorating moderate Islamic groups – also requires sub-
stantial and consistent efforts to be able to compete with the new conservative groups. Enjoying
dominance for too long, traditionally moderate groups like NU were not ready to adapt and compete
with the more tactical, media-aware, and capital-accumulating conservatives who have gathered
a large number of followers, including from among the new middle-class (Fealy 2019). Coupled with
the lack of new progressive figures of the calibre of Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholis Madjid,
scholars were not very optimistic when envisaging Indonesia’s future vis-à-vis religious tolerance.
Nevertheless, the result of 2019 election showed that grassroots support for moderate Islam was far
from gone (Hefner 2019); Indonesia’s religious discursive contestations will continue for years to
come.
Complementing these macro-level suggestions and identification of challenges, the current study
explores how the contemporary Indonesian young generation thinks about these discourses and in
what ways such discourses might give rise to a more religiously tolerant subjectivity. Do Pancasila
and moderate Islam still have appeal for them? Is conservatism considered ‘sexier’? How do young
people make sense of religious tolerance against this backdrop of contemporary Indonesia?
Corresponding with the aforementioned suggestions, educational studies on religious tolerance
in Indonesia also proposed at least two key recommendations: fostering religious tolerance through
Pancasila-based citizenship education, and drawing upon resources for tolerance from within
religions themselves. Parker (2018), for example, investigated the current Indonesian curriculum
and identified how Citizenship Education is based on Pancasila and strongly promotes tolerance, but
in contrast, RE is confessional and advocates piety. She suggested Indonesian RE policies be non-
theological, non-confessional, interfaith, participatory, and focusing on everyday religious co-
existence and the rights of minorities based on the Pancasila citizenship framework (Parker and
Hoon 2013; Hoon 2013). While Indonesian Education law requires students to be taught Religion by
teachers of the same faith, and in practice, RE is largely confessional (Leirvik 2004), there have been
initiatives by some NGOs (Parker 2010), individual teachers in specific schools (e.g. Parker 2014), and
universities (e.g. Wijaya Mulya and Aditomo 2019) which experimented with such forms of RE
without breaching the law or provoking protests from parents. One key element is drawing upon
resources from students’ own religion which promote tolerance (e.g. Rahmat, Firdaus, and Yahya
2019; Wijaya Mulya and Aditomo 2019). Examples of such resources are Baidhawy’s (2007) Islamic
multiculturalist theology which was built on concepts like ummah (living together), tafahum (mutual
understanding), takrim (mutual respect), and salam (peace); and Christiani’s (2005) proposal of
Christian RE based on a liberation theology of religions, which she called ‘RE behind, at, and beyond
the wall’. However, by focusing on policies, curriculum content, and specific projects/schools, these
studies have inadvertently positioned young people as passive recipients of educational initiatives
and left their voices unheard. Our research, therefore, sought to complement these existing studies
by listening to pre-service teachers’ voices, recognising their agency (and its underpinning dis-
courses), and, therefore, building religious tolerance from the bottom up. Listening to pre-service
teachers would significantly contribute to designing and implementing effective tolerance educa-
tion, and may avoid future bureaucratic compliance to policies or cosmetic adoption of curriculum
content – which has been a common secret in Indonesian educational practices.
Methodology
The data in this article came from a mixed-method study on teaching religious tolerance in
Indonesia. This current article reports on the qualitative part, while the quantitative part is reported
elsewhere. The participants were students in teacher education from two public universities (one
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Islamic and the other not religiously affiliated) in Surabaya, the second largest city in Indonesia.
Surabaya was also the city where a family of six carried out suicide bombings at three churches in
2018.
After ethics clearance was granted, we contacted the Heads of Early Childhood and the
Elementary Education Departments in these faculties, and all welcomed the project. They then
distributed questionnaires to their students following an ethics-approved procedure (e.g. letting
students freely choose whether to participate, and signing a consent form after being fully informed
about the study). At the end of the questionnaire, there was a question asking whether or not the
respondent was willing to participate in an audio-taped, semi-structured one-hour individual inter-
view about religious tolerance. Those participants who indicated willingness were then contacted,
completed another consent form, and interviewed at a public space at their campus according to
their preferred schedule and availability of the interviewer (the first author). All interviews were
conducted in the participants’ and interviewer’s first language, Bahasa Indonesia. The interview
guide included questions on participants’ religious backgrounds, experiences with the religious
Other, views on Indonesia’s religious relations, and plans for teaching tolerance in their future
work as teachers. A small amount of money (approx. USD 3.5) was given at the end of the interview
as a token of appreciation for participants’ time. As many as seven Muslim students were inter-
viewed; four from the non-religiously-affiliated public university and three from the Islamic one, two
males and five females (all five wearing a hijab). All but one of the participants were raised in
a moderate Islamic tradition (NU or Muhammadiyah), which was unsurprising as Muslims from these
groups are usually more willing to participate in an interview about religious tolerance. All partici-
pants’ names in this article are pseudonyms, and data excerpts presented in this article were
translated to English by the authors.
The data were analysed using a discourse analysis method (Willig 2013). The researchers read the
interview transcripts over and over again to identify a set of ideas, assumptions, or ‘logics’ (i.e.
discourses), which constitute participants’ ways of understanding religious tolerance. These dis-
courses were then categorised, reviewed, articulated, and discussed in the Findings section below.
The credibility of the data and the analysis is not predicated on traditional criteria such as repre-
sentativeness and generalisability, but instead on methodological integrity, authenticity, and the
insightfulness of the findings for the advancement of knowledge in the field of religious tolerance
education. The methodology emphasises the immediacy and verisimilitude of participants’ narra-
tives for the wider Indonesian audience and relevant readers; not sample size or its statistical
representativeness.
Findings
In this section we discuss at least three dominant discourses through which the participants gave
meaning to religious tolerance in contemporary Indonesia, namely, a discourse of spiritual Islam,
a discourse of postmodern sensibilities, and a discourse of concern about conservative, Islamist, or
radical groups. While participants’ views about religious tolerance presented here might not always
be explicitly spoken in relation to their future teaching roles, we believe that a tolerant teacher
(including their tolerant religious beliefs) is the first step towards effective religious tolerance
education in Indonesian contexts (Suryani 2017, 2020a�, 2020b�). Therefore, understanding how pre-
service teacher participants personally took up a religiously tolerant subjectivity and the discourses
they drew upon are crucial for advancing religious tolerance and tolerance education.
A discourse of spiritual Islam
As opposed to conservative groups, which tend to emphasise (religious) truth claims, obligations,
morality, and external expressions of religiosity, some pre-service teachers in this study understand
their religion as a personal spiritual journey in which they seek existential meaningfulness,
BRITISH JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 5
cultivation of inner peace, and embracing uncertainty. We call this a discourse of spiritual Islam, and
we argue that it is one of the key discourses through which religious tolerance was constituted in the
ways participants understand themselves as a religious person.
During the interviews some participants’ expressed a lack of interest in (religious) truth claims in
preference for the more affective and spiritual aspects of religion, which in turn, shaped their
approaches to the religious Other. Helmi (male, 7th semester, Islamic university), for example,
narrated:
I once listened to one of those (conservative) preachers. He has a doctoral degree. But his words did not enter
(touch) my heart. He can answer all questions, knows all (theological) bases of Islamic jurisprudence, but he was
not pleasant to be listened to. It’s very different with a preacher, like, a graduate from a pesantren. The face (of
preachers graduated from pesantren) already radiates peacefulness, which is very calming, even before the
sermon begins.
Helmi was referring to the new generation of Indonesian conservative preachers who are becom-
ing popular; many of them were educated in the Middle East. Helmi contrasted their preaching
style, which is centred on theological truth claims, with the traditional style of local preachers who
graduated from pesantren (Islamic boarding schools, mainly affiliated with NU and located in rural
areas or small towns). For Helmi, ‘debating doctrines’ and ‘vilifying other preachers, like calling
them stupid’ do not connect with his ways of understanding and practising Islam; it does not bring
peace to his heart. Growing up in pesantrens himself, Helmi understands Islam as ‘refined’ and
‘tolerant’, which then translates into his attitudes to other religions although he had very limited
contact with non-Muslims throughout his life. Counter to Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954),
Helmi’s very limited exposure to the religious Other did not necessarily result in prejudice, most
likely due to the nature of Islamic teachings commonly taught in pesantrens. As Afrianty (2012) and
Sirry (2020) noted, Indonesian pesantren graduates are traditionally moderate, therefore being
relatively tolerant to the religious Other. In contrast, most of the new conservatives are the urban
middle-class who were not traditionally religious and then found new religious enthusiasm in
conservative teachings.
Constituting tolerance through a view of Islam as spiritual rather than doctrinal also implies an
emphasis on internal processes of cultivating oneself, as opposed to overt rituals, symbols, identity,
or other external expressions of religiosity. Arif (male, 7th semester, non-religiously-affiliated uni-
versity) spoke about how he had enough of his friends who debated whether or not Muslim men
should grow a beard and wear flood pants, which they believe are recommended in the sacred texts.
Arif considers Islam is ‘much deeper’ than such superficial debate about external appearance. Helmi
also used similar language of depth and interiority when discussing the incident of flag burning in
Garut in 2018, when a group of youths burnt a flag of an illegal Islamist group with an Arabic word
tauhid (literally translates ‘Oneness of God’ and often used to refer to God) on it, which then sparked
outrage among Muslims. Helmi said:
It is okay to glorify the word tauhid, but what’s more important is to let it sink deep into your soul, no need to
overly glorify its printing on a flag. Islamic law becomes unimportant when you prioritise the more spiritual
aspects of Islam. Islam does not need to be too controlling, because it is already, kind of, tasawwuf (Sufism/
Islamic mysticism) for me.
The rhetoric of defending Islam has been effectively deployed by Indonesian Islamic hardliners to
justify intolerance and persecution (Irawan 2017), such as against the Ahmadis or Jakarta’s ex-
Governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama. Contesting such rhetoric, Arif and Helmi drew upon the discourse
of spiritual Islam to position intolerant attitudes in the name of defending Islam as superficial and
missing the whole point of being religious, which for them, is mystical in nature. This understanding
reflects the Sufic or mystical understandings and practices accommodated within NU traditions with
which Arif and Helmi were affiliated. Correspondingly, Helmi added that he ‘do(es) not feel comfor-
table with the new sharia trends’ which emphasise compliance to Islamic law and external expres-
sions of religiosity including in one’s attire, consumption, and public morality.
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Strict adherence to sharia or Islamic rules/recommendations has become a new trend in the last
two decades in Indonesia, particularly since it was co-opted by businesses and industries. While it has
been legally enforced through local regulations in some regions like Aceh, it also manifests in the
wider economic contexts through products and services brandishing a sharia label, including
fashion, food, banking, and gender-separated spatial designs. As Arif said during the interview,
even glasses and toilet paper are now sold using ‘halal’ as the tag line. In youth social life, sharia
trends develop into a tendency to ‘correct’ other Muslims who do not strictly follow those rules/
recommendations and, to a degree, positioning them as sinful. Contrasting this tendency with
a more spiritual version of Islam, Mutiara (female, 5th semester, Islamic university) said: ‘I don’t like
to give (religious) advice to others, perhaps, I think it is more meaningful if someone finds the Way
themselves.’ Mutiara observed that her hijra/born-again Muslim friends like to give advice about
what is right, what should be worn, or with whom a Muslim girl should not accompany. However,
although gentle advice was given, it still made her ‘feel sinful’. Mutiara does not feel comfortable
with those comments, as she believes religion is more about her personal journey of finding
meaningfulness rather than obedience to authoritatively imposed rules. In a similar vein, Arif gave
a powerful story about tolerance and not being too quick to judge others.
There is a story in a Hadist1 about a prostitute who went to heaven because she kindly gave food and drink to
a hungry stray dog. You know, she lived in sin everyday [because of her work] and dogs are considered unclean
animals, right? So, then, who am I to decide who is sinful and will go to hell? Yes I pray five times a day, but it is
up to God to receive or reject my observance.
The story Arif told contrasts kindness with religious observance/obedience as the criterion for
salvation, with the former being prioritised but without abandoning the latter. Instead of truth
claims, enforcement of rules, and judging others, a discourse of spiritual Islam espouses kindness,
uncertainty, and humble submission to God, which all foster more tolerant attitudes towards the
religious Other and even the socially-stigmatised, like sex workers and transgender people. The late
former President and NU Chairperson, Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, attended a transgender
beauty contest, gesturing support and acceptance of their gender identity (Pandia 2006). Later, this
affirming position was adopted by the Wahid Foundation (2016). Through a discourse of spiritual
Islam, transgender communities, which have frequently been persecuted by hardliners for deviating
from conservative religious interpretations, become more possible to be tolerated and welcomed.
Like Helmi said, spiritual Islam reduces gender identity into ‘an external shell irrelevant for one’s
religious life’.
Perhaps, a crucial question is in what ways may this discourse of spiritual Islam be appealing for
contemporary Indonesian youth, particularly the new conservative urban middle-class? As Fealy
(2019) identified, the traditional style of NU preachers with long and reflective discussions may not
be as appealing to contemporary urban audiences as compared to conservatives’ highly effective
use of websites, social media, emotionally charged language, and snappy images to incite intoler-
ance. In order to rejuvenate the moderate groups, we propose that spiritual Islam might have
potential appeals for contemporary Indonesian youth. As urban youth becomes more aware of
and pays attention to their mental health and a deeper sense of meaningfulness, some participants’
narratives in this study (like Arif, Helmi, and Mutiara) illustrate a possibility that popular appeals of
conservatism may just be momentary, and youth may soon be tired of the self-righteousness,
negativity, and sharia demands imposed upon them; evidence of this has been reported in
a recent study (i.e. Sirry 2020). Akin to Bass (2013) vision of spiritual Christianity, it is within the
contemporary contexts of the global environmental crisis, political conflicts, and the ethos of
neoliberal hustle culture that a spiritual version of Islam might offer a consolation – a slower, gentler,
friendlier, and deeper way of making sense the world. This in turn may better fulfill young people’s
psychological and existential needs. The increasing popularity of yoga and meditation, for instance,
is a promising example of how a traditional spiritual practice (and worldview) can be re-
appropriated, commodified, and widely accepted by some segments of middle-class Indonesians.
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A discourse of postmodern sensibilities
‘That’s just no longer suitable for our era now.’
Irma (female, 5th semester, Islamic university),
on a claim of single religious truth
The second discourse underpinning participants’ ways of being tolerant relates to postmodern
sensibilities, where a sense of inevitable multiplicity of (grand) narratives results in a more careful
and tolerant attitude for the religious Other. In their increasingly connected worlds, it is almost
impossible for Indonesian youth to avoid encounters with the religious Other. These encounters
have sometimes resulted in epistemic humility with regard to their own religious beliefs (Kraft and
Basinger 2016), and at other times working on an affective level by familiarising participants with and
humanising the religious Other (Wijaya Mulya and Aditomo 2019); both give rise to a more reli-
giously tolerant subjectivity. As Irma’s words above illustrate, most participants in this study take for
granted the multiplicity of religions and religious truths, and consider it impossible in our time now
to deny such multiplicity.
While Indonesia is religiously diverse, the segregated patterns of urban sociality (e.g. going to
religion-based schools or living in a homogenous neighbourhood) may hinder many Indonesian
youths from having meaningful interactions with the religious Other. The data in this study showed
that participants from the non-religiously-affiliated university have more opportunities to meet
friends from different religions. Laila (female, 1st semester, non-religiously-affiliated university), for
example, enthusiastically told her experience of having a Catholic roommate in the university
dormitory, which is her first non-Muslim close friend. Studying in the Islamic university, Helmi has
no non-Muslim friends, but Mutiara likes to hang out in cafés where she made friends with non-
Muslims who were mostly friends of her friends. According to Allport (1954), the key point is that
these interactions need to be equal and promote common humanity. In the current study, most of
participants’ encounters with the religious Other were positive and friendly, some include conversa-
tions about their differing faiths in a relaxed atmosphere like Laila’s and Mutiara’s experiences. Other
participants who have no non-Muslim friends have non-Muslim neighbours, and those who have no
non-Muslim neighbours have a relative who married someone who converted from another religion.
During the wedding and subsequent family events such as funerals or cultural celebrations, guests
came into contact with the family of the converted. This was the case in Annisa’s (female, 3rd
semester, non-religiously-affiliated university) and Icha’s (female, 3rd semester, non-religiously-
affiliated university) experiences. Outside friendship and family relations, participants engaged in
meaningful interactions with the religious Other in their teaching internships (e.g. a Christian student
in their class), part time job as a tutor, and campus activities like organising a camp with the regional
Scout leader (who apparently is a Buddhist). However segregated Indonesian contemporary societies
may be, participants’ narratives in this study showed there are plenty of opportunities for Indonesian
urban youth to have meaningful and positive interfaith interactions (Sumaktoyo 2018), which have
then helped them to realise the existence of the religious Other and the multiplicity of religious truth.
Various (sometimes conflicting) groups within Islam itself have also played a crucial role in
enabling participants to see religion and religious truth as neither singular nor monolithic. Annisa
grew up in a village where NU and Muhammadiyah traditions co-exist. Therefore Annisa is aware of
different versions of Islamic tradition, and that there are people who strictly follow one and those like
her parents who follow both. Similarly, in Irma’s village there are NU, Muhammadiyah, and the more
conservative LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Institute of Islamic Dawah); each
has their own mosque/musholla. Growing up in an NU tradition, Irma has a memorable experience
about when she once prayed at the LDII’s musholla, as ‘the place was immediately cleaned after
I finished (praying), which made me think, am I dirty or what?’ Experiences with different strands of
Islam that have different levels of openness or tolerance facilitated participants to see the
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intracategorical diversity within a religion, and as a result, they may see other religions as internally
diverse too and not be too quick to overgeneralise. For instance, Mutiara was once ‘treated not very
nice’ by the mother of her Chinese-Christian private tuition student and guessed it was because of
her hijab; but she did not attribute the discriminatory gesture to Christians in general.
Another important consequence of the encounter with, and understanding of the multiplicity of
religious truth, is that most of these pre-service teachers feel comfortable when disagreeing with
religious authorities. Claims of a single truth and certainty, these pre-service teachers find, are no
longer relevant. It was quite common among participants during the interview to begin a sentence
with the phrase ‘according to Islamic teachings, . . . ’ and then continued with the phrase ‘but
according to me personally, . . . ’ where they then expressed a different view. For instance, Mutiara
explained that ‘according to Islamic teachings, yes, all non-Muslims will go to hell; but my personal
view, I cannot say it’s true or false. I haven’t died, so how can I know for sure?’ Mutiara was confident
to challenge one of the basic doctrines in Abrahamic faiths, namely, the doctrine of salvation, which
often differentiates the exclusivist from the inclusivist positions. Other participants even took a form
of pluralist position where all religions are seen as good, true in their own way, and even comple-
mentary. For example, Irma said several times during the interview that ‘all religions are the same,
they have the same objective’ and ‘my religion is not the only true one’. Also, Irma mentioned
‘perhaps, religions complement each other’. Such pluralist view on religious relations, given rise by
a sense of postmodern multiplicity, is a valuable discursive resource in the constitution of partici-
pants’ religiously tolerant subjectivity because it fosters religious epistemic humility (Kraft and
Basinger 2016).
How can the participants then translate these multiple truths into their everyday social living? If
everyone exercises agency to differ from authority, how does authority then keep society together
harmoniously? This is where the notion of Pancasila citizenship came onto the scene. Asked such
questions, the participants drew upon ideas of democracy, citizenship, and Pancasila as regulatory
frameworks, which hold all different (religious) groups together. Like Mutiara said,
I am fine with friends who wear burqas, or go to nightclubs, or even who are lesbians, I treat them all well. I don’t
judge their morality. As long as they don’t disturb me or my privacy, I am anti-judging (laugh). But if they
threaten me or violate my rights, I will fight back.
In explaining her tolerant position about those who are different and even stigmatised, Mutiara drew
upon ideas of respecting rights, individuality, freedom, and ethics of reciprocity, all of which are
features of liberal democracy. Other participants appeal more specifically to Indonesia’s contexts,
history, and foundations of democratic citizenship, such as Arif who spoke against Islamist groups
enforcing their own truth using threats and violence: ‘We should not betray our founding fathers
[sic], those who fought for Indonesia’s independence were not only Muslims. We need to do
democracy better.’ Similarly, Annisa takes for granted the unity of Indonesia as non-negotiable:
‘They (the Islamists) should not do that, Indonesia would be broken. I don’t understand why they are
like that.’ These participants’ narratives substantiate Parker and Hoon’s (2013) suggestion for
religious tolerance education and citizenship education to be conjoined, where Pancasila becomes
the basis for peaceful religious coexistence and protection of religious minorities. By drawing upon
the notion of democratic citizenship, these pre-service teachers’ sense of postmodern multiplicity
does not necessarily result in relativism nor anarchism, as often presented as fear mongering by the
conservatives (e.g. ‘MUI Fatwa Haram’ 2019), but instead as respect for individual freedom and
tolerance for the religious Other.
A discourse of concern over conservative, Islamist, or radical groups
The final key discourse identified in this study relates to concern over conservative, Islamist, or radical
groups, in which religious tolerance is constituted as being constantly haunted by the threats of
hard-line Islamism. As can be seen in previous sections, most participants have a sensitive awareness
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about the growing existence of conservative and hard-line Islamic groups. Participants who came
from other towns to study in Surabaya like Laila, Annisa, and Irma were repeatedly warned by their
family to avoid any invitations to join a suspicious Islamic group. As Annisa explained, these groups
are infamous for aggressively recruiting new members that include offering support such as emo-
tional, food, money, helping hands, and a strong sense of community (see also Sirry 2020). Most
participants have at least one friend who had joined an Islamic group with a tendency to be
conservative, Islamist, or radical. Based on their experience with such friends, participants referred
to these groups as ‘close-minded’, ‘judgmental�’, ‘fanatic’, and ‘backward’. Some participants them-
selves, like Irma, had been invited to such groups but they did not join, as they feared being
‘brainwashed’, ‘radicalised’, and ‘unable to leave the community’. It is through this awareness of
Muslims groups associated with intolerance operating around them that participants’ ways of
understanding tolerance were constituted.
Participants’ undertone throughout the interview on this specific topic was ‘we against them’ or
‘we are preyed on by them’. These participants realised that it is a difficult situation or even
a paradox: How far should we tolerate potentially intolerant groups? While showing concerns and
fear, some participants also believe that these groups should not be discriminated against nor
frowned upon before proven guilty of radicalism, like those wearing burqas, as it could be over-
generalising and judgemental. Annisa argued that ‘we should not see women in burqas negatively.
I have a friend who now wears a burqa. This friend joined such a group at the time her parents were
divorcing and she was provided with support and is not a radical.’ Annisa drew attention to
situations that may lead someone into such involvement and invited us to be considerate of the
reasons behind their decisions.
One of the participants in this study, Icha, associated herself with conservative Islam. Icha, who
was studying at the non-religiously-affiliated university, narrated difficult situations that led her to
become a conservative:
It all begins at Year 7 [±13 years old] when I went to a school camp. You know, in a forest like that, there are
[invincible] creatures/spirit, you know, who disturb people. It was my friend who got [possessed], I just tried to
calm her, but it was angry or something so it followed me home. Every day it told me ‘you are useless, you better
kill yourself’, every day for seven years! I was then too afraid to go out, go to school, I was just afraid. When it
possessed me, I hurt myself, banged my head, sliced my skin. Other times, when I walked, it pushed me down, or
choked me. Local Muslim people [in her hometown in Central Java] believe we should make friend/peace with it,
like give offerings. But how can I make friend with someone who told me to kill myself? So my father had a friend
who had been hijra [born again], and he took me for a rukiyah [spirit cleansing], and it was better. That was the
beginning of our hijra. We then moved to this town [in the metropolitan area of Surabaya], so I can enroll in an
Islamic school, which is more supportive. My [former] teachers in the public school were not [supportive] and
they accused me of lying and truancy. In my hometown people were shallow-minded, like when my Dad was
wearing flood pants or me wearing a large hijab, they looked at us from head to toe. In big cities like Surabaya,
people are more tolerant about such things. Now I am not afraid [to the ghost] anymore, it has not completely
gone, still sometimes disturbs me, but I don’t care, because I have Allah with me.
At the time of the interview, Icha was actively involved in a conservative Islamic group and she
hoped to be able to wear a burqa without being discriminated against. Icha’s transition has involved
wearing a regular hijab and face mask (long before the COVID-19 pandemic). Icha wishes that
Indonesians could be ‘more tolerant’ with conservative Muslims like her and her family and not
associate them with terrorists. While Icha is against ‘any forms of religious violence’, she personally
believes that ‘it is better if all Indonesians are Muslims’ and that ‘sharia law like in Aceh is ideal for
Indonesia’.
In both scholarly publications on religious tolerance in Indonesia and the authors’ experience with
interfaith dialogues, a recognition of the voice of the conservatives like Icha’s, beyond the context of
deradicalisation is considerably rare, not to mention the complexity of dealing with it. A remotely
relevant theorisation might be Mietzner’s (2018) three strategies of democratically handling anti-
democratic movements. The first is ‘militant democracy’, that is, defending democracy by aggressively
criminalising and banning anti-democracy groups. While generally effective, this strategy, which
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aggressively limits freedom of expression, may undermine democracy itself. Correspondingly, protect-
ing tolerance by legally banning or socially repudiating intolerant groups may contradict the very
notion of tolerance itself, like Icha felt. The second strategy is ‘tolerating the intolerant’, namely,
accommodating anti-democratic groups with the hope of moderating their radical views. However, as
evident in President Yudhoyono’s (2004–2014) accommodation of Islamist groups (Mietzner 2018), it
might have been radicalising the moderates, rather than vice versa. The third is ‘concentric contain-
ment’ in which anti-democratic actors are aggressively repressed, but issues driving their followers
into anti-democracy are systematically addressed, such as poverty. In Icha’s case, for example, if there
are viable alternative solutions from moderate groups for her problem beyond the traditional
animistic approach of befriending ghosts or modern psychiatry’s heavily-stigmatised pathologisation,
she might not need to resort to a conservative, less tolerant strand of Islam.
In line with the purpose of this article, we focused on the ways Muslim pre-service teacher
participants in this study understand and respond to the growing conservatism in contemporary
Indonesia. Within their everyday social contexts, it appears that most participants leaned towards
the second strategy, namely, accommodation; and put the responsibility on individuals themselves
to avoid being radicalised. Helmi, for example, did not like listening to debates between moderate
and hardliner preachers on television or Youtube, such as on the ex-Jakarta Governor’s blasphemy
case. He said, ‘I don’t want to take sides, I just hope we all can get along well. The moderate leaders
can bersilaturahmi (visit/befriend) the hardliners, and vice versa. Thus, people can feel at peace,
instead of attacking each other like this.’ Rather than politically banning or theologically addressing
differences which give rise to (in)tolerance, elite diplomacy is consideredmore effective and peaceful
for Helmi. Similarly, Irma was also not comfortable with the banning of radical preachers: ‘If the
government bans them, the people are not getting smarter. Young people must learn to be smart,
able to filter out radical teachings themselves. Just don’t follow messages you think are bad.’ Living
in an increasingly neoliberal Indonesia, Irma sees that responsibilisation of youth is a key to avoid
radicalism and foster tolerance without being intolerant. In Irma’s view, the ideal young people in the
religious marketplace would be ‘smart customers’ who carefully choose from among various mes-
sages and ways of being a Muslim.
Coupled with the fact that participants in this study have a friend who is conservative, Islamist, or
radical, their positions on these versions of Islam might have been caught up between fear, empathy,
and a commitment to diversity. While we believe that the key is to strike ‘a balance between state
involvement in ensuring the protection of minority rights and tolerance of difference in the public
sphere, while at the same time allowing space for civic participation and cross-cultural fertilisation to
take place organically among the citizenry’ (Hoon 2017, 489), it is indeed a complex and intricate task
involving various actors and involves a significant amount of time to reach democratic maturity.
Nevertheless, our argument in this section is much more modest, namely, to demonstrate that
constituting religious tolerance in the contexts of contemporary Indonesia evidently and inevitably
involves thinking through the tensions around the growing conservative, Islamist, and radical groups.
Conclusion: implications for religious tolerance education in Indonesia
This article has discussed three key discourses drawn upon by Indonesian Muslim pre-service
teachers in understanding religious tolerance, namely, a discourse of spiritual Islam, postmodern
sensibilities, and concern over conservatism, Islamism, and radicalism. A crucial question might be
what the implications are in identifying these key discourses for religious tolerance education in
contemporary Indonesia. The data showed that participants’ access to discourses of religious
tolerance was not through formal education. When explicitly asked during their interviews, most
participants responded that tolerance was formally taught in Citizenship Education but had no real
impact on their ways of being tolerant. They mostly learnt how to be tolerant from their own
experiences. Unsurprisingly, participants’ plans for teaching tolerance in their future work were
vague and superficial, such as ‘telling my students to be tolerant’ (Laila).
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As the authors, we propose that religious tolerance education may be more effective when
connected to discourses which ‘make sense’ for students; some of which were identified in this
study. While non-confessional, interfaith RE might still not be widely-adopted in the near future, the
content of confessional RE can at least be more spiritual rather than doctrinal, such as stories or
parables on kindness, empathy, uncertainty, personal journeys, and non-judgemental gestures,
which are already available in each religious tradition. Learning assessments may not necessarily
be written tests with one right answer, which implies single religious truth; but can be reflective
assignments on experiential learning, such as spiritual pilgrimage to local sites, or positive conversa-
tions and experiences with the religious Other.
Facilitating students to encounter and discuss intra-categorical multiplicities within their own
religion may also be beneficial to help students become less judgemental or overgeneralise about
other religions. While opportunities for positive, meaningful interfaith interactions might not always
be available, virtual experiences through movies or social media posts can also be incorporated into
the classroom considering students’ familiarity with such media. It may also be important for
teachers to be supportive of students who disagree with them, as democratic spaces for critiques
and multiple perspectives might be preferred by contemporary young Indonesians and could
contribute to more tolerant subjectivity.
Finally, religious tolerance education in contemporary Indonesian contexts, particularly in uni-
versities, might need to include more complex discussions about conservative, Islamist, and radical
groups, such as their politicisations, experiences of discrimination, and reasons for their distrust in
democracy. At the classroom level, an accommodating approach might be seen as more tolerant
whereby conservatives are considered as a legitimate ‘option’ of being an Indonesian Muslim, but
simultaneously position them as one version of Islam, not the one and only. Here, Pancasila as
a citizenship framework is still a valuable and powerful resource for teaching religious tolerance, but
it needs to be taught in an inclusive, relevant, contextualised manner.
Note
1. Hadists are sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. In Islam, Hadists are considered to be the second primary source
of Islamic jurisprudence, after the Quran.
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